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Abstract: Shannon observed the relation between information entropy and Maxwell demon experiment to come 
up with information entropy formula. After that, Shannon’s entropy formula is widely used to measure 
information leakage in imperative programs. But in the present work, our aim is to go in a reverse direction and 
try to find possible Maxwell’s demon experimental setup for contemporary practical imperative programs in 
which variations of Shannon’s entropy formula has been applied to measure the information leakage. To 
establish the relation between the second principle of thermodynamics and quantitative analysis of information 
leakage, present work models contemporary variations of imperative programs in terms of Maxwell’s demon 
experimental setup. In the present work five contemporary variations of imperative program related to 
information quantification are identified. They are: (1) information leakage in imperative program (2) 
imperative multithreaded program (3) point to point leakage in the imperative program (4) imperative program 
with infinite observation and (5) imperative program in the SOA-based environment. For these variations, 
minimal work required by an attacker to gain the secret is also calculated using historical Maxwell’s demon 
experiment. To model the experimental setup of Maxwell’s demon, non-interference security policy is used. In 
the present work, imperative programs with one-bit secret information have been considered to avoid the 
complexity. The findings of the present work from the history of physics can be utilized in many areas related to 
information flow of physical computing, nano-computing, quantum computing, biological computing, energy 
dissipation in computing and computing power analysis. 
Keywords: Information, Maxwell’s demon, Second Principle of Thermodynamics, Information security, 
Reversible system 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From the early days of computers and computing processes, physics and computer fields have a 
long traditional straddling. The physics field considers computers as an engine. The engine which 
uses its energy to generate mathematical work and while doing this work it generates heat. This 
phenomenon can be shown in the equation below: 
Computational engine energy = mathematical work + waste heat      .... (1) 
In the present paper, the aim is to link the conventional and contemporary methods used for 
quantitative analysis of information leakage in imperative programs with the physics. For this 
purpose, the second principle of thermodynamics and Maxwell’s demon [7] has been used. Our aim is 
to show that even if system leaks information, the attacker has to do a certain amount of physical 
work to obtain leaked information. For this purpose, various experimental setups for Maxwell’s 
demon have been considered.  
In physics, simple meaning of information has been considered, i.e. “information is any entity 
which you don’t already know” [4]. To measure the information, Claude Shannon came up with the 
information entropy and information theory in 1948. He suggested that larger the information content, 
larger the entropy. To find the entropy of information, Shannon considered thermodynamic microstate 
of a computer system with a certain degree of freedom and came up with information entropy 
formula. 
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In computer science, to quantify information leakage in secure imperative programs, the non-
interference property is also used along with the information theory. The non-interference policy is 
confidentiality policy which secure programs satisfy to protect the information. To satisfy non-
interference property [2], the computer system is divided into low-security sensitive input/output 
entities and high-security sensitive input/output entities. A system satisfies non-interference policy if 
any sequence of low input will produce the same low output regardless of the high input. Denning [1] 
first introduced quantitative information flow. Her work revealed that to quantify information leakage, 
change in uncertainty associated with information at different state needs to be considered. After that, 
a lot of work has been done to quantify information leakage in imperative programs using Shannon’s 
entropy and non-interference. In [8, 9], quantitative analysis of information leakage in abstract 
computational systems have been studied using Denning’s principle. After that Clark, Hunt and 
Malacaria [10, 11] started quantifying information leakage in imperative programs with loops 
conditions and assignment statements. All the work related to quantification of information leakage in 
the imperative program was based on Shannon’s entropy formula. In some other cases like 
quantification of leakage in a multithreaded program, non-terminating program, mathematically 
derived variations of Shannon’s entropy formula was used. As a reason, the aim of the proposed work 
is to go back to the history and try to find the possible setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment for the 
mathematically derived variations of Shannon entropy formulas.  
The benefit to revisit Maxwell’s experiment for various variation of Shannon entropy formula is 
it will relate physics and computer again. Solutions of many complex problems related to 
quantification of information flow can be thought of by physicist as well as computer scientists. 
Information flow security in quantum computing and nano-computing is also based on the Maxwell 
demon experiment. The proposed work may open the doors in that direction also.   
In the present paper, five types of imperative programs have been derived. For these programs, 
mathematically and information theoretically derived variations of Shannon entropy formula have 
been used in literature. For these five types of contemporary imperative programs, the relation 
between quantitative analysis of information leakage and Maxwell’s demon principle will be derived. 
Not only possible Maxwell’s demon experimental setup but also the amount of minimal work 
required to keep secure content protected from the attacker will also be calculated. In other words, 
work required by the attacker to obtain the secret content from the imperative programs has been 
calculated. The five types of imperative programs in which variations of Shannon’s entropy formula 
has bees been used are as below: 
1. Simple imperative program: The quantification of information leakage in the simple 
imperative program has been described by Clark, Hunt and Malacaria in [10, 11].  
2. Imperative multithreaded program: To quantify information leakage in the imperative 
multithreaded program, scheduler effect also needs to be considered. In [12, 13, 14] information 
leakage has been quantified in the imperative multithreaded program. 
3. Point to point information leakage in the imperative program: This method was first 
proposed by Tom Chothiya et al. in [15]. In this paper, a method has been proposed to find leakage 
between any two arbitrary points in the imperative probabilistic program. This method makes 
convenient to measure specific leaks in the program and it can investigate information security of 
specific portion of the program. 
4. Information leakage of non-terminating processes: In some programs or systems, secret 
contents are continuously generated as they execute repeatedly. In [20], F. Biondi et al. have 
quantified information leakage in such programs where secret content is infinite. 
5. SOA based web services: In this method, loosely coupled components provide services to 
other component and in this way information flow is generated. Thus, in SOA based web services, 
interference is not only between high-security sensitive content and low-security sensitive content 
but it is among secure content and low-security sensitive content and other architectural parameters 
[16].  
The motivation for this work has been explained in the subsection below. 
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1.1 Motivation and aim 
Our motivation for present work is two dimensional, one dimension is about computational 
physics and the second dimension is related to non-interference policy. In computational physics, two 
types of devices are described i.e. logically reversible devices and logically irreversible devices. In the 
logically reversible devices, the inputs of the devices can be uniquely identified by observing their 
output, while in logically irreversible devices; inputs can’t be uniquely determined by observing their 
output. Some of the examples of logically irreversible devices are Boolean operations like AND, OR, 
XOR [6]. 
The physical devices relate observable outputs and inputs; similarly, non-interference policy 
relates observable (low-security sensitive contents) and secure content. In simple words, the attacker 
should not be able to know the secure content by observing output or observables of the system. Thus 
if we relate physical computation and non-interference, we can derive that the aim of the non-
interference property is to convert the system or program into the irreversible system. But as 
described in [3], it is not possible to satisfy non-interference property completely in any system. At 
some point, low-security sensitive content and high-security sensitive content will always interfere. 
That means in computational physics terminology, at some point system will become logically 
reversible device and it can violate the second principle of thermodynamics as suggested by Rolf 
Landauer in 1961 in [23]. Landauer suggested that these "reversible" measurements could be used to 
sort the molecules and violating the Second Law. Our aim in this paper is to observe this logically 
reversible device when Maxwell demon experiment and Landauer’s principle is applied to them. And 
through this observation, study the non-interference property from a physical aspect. Thus, in short, 
the non-interference policy and Shannon’s entropy both are related to physics in one or the other way, 
that’s the hint that encourages us to study quantitative analysis of information leakage of various 
systems from thermodynamics and physics aspects. In the present work, the phenomenon of the 
reversible and irreversible system has been relaxed compared to quantum computing. In quantum 
computing, the system is reversible only if all the prior states are physically achievable. In the present 
work even if the attacker is logically able to get the initial variable value or state after the execution of 
program then the program is considered as reversible in the present work.  
 
1.2 Organization of paper 
Section-2 of the paper incorporates preliminary concepts required to understand the paper. It 
contains information about Maxwell’s demon and the relation between Shannon’s entropy formula 
and the second principle of thermodynamics. In section-3, Maxwell demon experimental setup for 
five types of imperative programs is discussed. 1. The simple imperative program, 2 imperative 
multithreaded program 3 imperative program with a point to point information leakage 4 imperative 
program which generates infinite leakage or observable and 5 SOA implementation of the imperative 
program. In section-3 physical work required to obtain secret from attacker’s perspective is also 
calculated. Section-4 provides a review of literature related to physics, information theory, and 
computation. In section-5 conclusion and possible future work in the direction of physics and 
quantitative analysis of information leakage has been discussed. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, some of the concept relating physics and information are included. The physics 
and information theory is associated with each other because of the second principle of 
thermodynamics. The second principle of thermodynamics associates state function known as entropy 
S and states when the system undergoes transformation [17]. In simple words, the second principle of 
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thermodynamics states that any system will absorb heat at temperature say T, and then if the system is 
irreversible then it will dissipate a certain amount of energy which can be used to do work.  
Thus as per the second law of thermodynamics, 
Δ S ≥ 
  
 
                                                    ... (2)  
Where Δ S is changed in entropy of the system; T is temperature and    is heat. Shannon 
considered equation-2 with microstates and with degrees of freedom and got entropy formula of 
information as shown in equation-3 below: 
S =                                          .... (3) 
Where P is uncertainty associated with the state of the system and S is the entropy of information. 
From Shannon’s formula shown in equation-3, physical work in terms of computing can be described 
[17] as: 
W = S (h | P)                                       .....(4) 
In equation-4, S is Shannon’s entropy, h is secure information and P is observables which are 
probabilistically related to inputs. Equation-4 also hints that physical work and Shannon’s entropy can 
be related.  
From equation-2, Maxwell bought very interesting concept which is known as Maxwell’s demon 
which can relate quantification of information and energy dissipation. This concept has been 
explained below. 
 
2.1 Maxwell’s Demon and information quantification 
In a thought experiment, Maxwell considered a system with two neighboring chambers at the 
same temperature initially. The demon is an intelligent agent who can observe the molecules of gas in 
both the chambers. In both the chambers, some of the molecules will be moving faster than the 
average while some will be slower. The demon will be able to open and close the molecule size 
trapdoor available in the partitioning wall of two chambers and collect faster (hot) molecules in on 
chamber and slow (cold) particles in the other chamber. Maxwell suggested that this temperature 
difference can be used to create useful work. Based on Maxwell’s demon, simplified one molecule 
model was introduced in [18, 19]. From a computational perspective, Bennet’s model of Maxwell’s 
demon has been described in the figure-1. 
In figure-1 as shown in level-1, the demon is completely ignorant about the position of a gas 
molecule in the closed system. The system is connected to a heat reservoir at temperature T0. From 
information security perspectives, the demon can be considered as an attacker and system can be 
considered as a computer program. The secret information in the system is a place of the particle in 
the system. In level-2, the demon inserts partition without any cost in the closed system which divides 
the system into two chambers. Now demons know that the particle is either in the left chamber or in 
the right chamber. From computer science perspective it can be said that attacker is ready to execute 
the program now. In level-3, the demon is ready to insert the piston into the system without any cost. 
It is assumed that piston is inserted in the system till partition and still whereabouts of the particle is 
unknown. This is similar to the situation in the computer where the attacker knows that computer 
program is divided into low and high-security sensitive content but doesn’t know anything about the 
high-security content before execution. The information about the whereabouts of the particle in the 
system has been compared with the high-security sensitive content. In level-4, demon pushes the 
piston isothermally till the end of the chamber say towards the left side. To push the chamber, demon 
requires physical work       , where kB is Boltzmann constant and T is temperature. In level-5, the 
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demon will remove the partition in the chamber without any cost. The situation shown in level-4 and 
level-5 can be compared with the situation in computer science when attacker executes the program 
and waiting for the outcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1 Relation between information entropy and physical entropy 
Due to the expansion, in level-6, the system will come to its original state. If the particle was on 
the left side then, the gas molecule will do the work and heat will flow into the reservoir. If the 
particle is on the right of the piston, then heat will flow from reservoir [33]. By observing heat of the 
reservoir, the attacker will be able to know that whether the particle was in the right chamber or left 
the chamber. In computer science terminology, it is similar to the situation where the attacker knows 
about the secret content by observing the outcome of the program after program execution due to a 
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violation of non-interference. Because of this interference, previous state of high-security sensitive 
content will be known to the attacker by observing the output. That means, in the physical term, the 
system will be reversible. 
 Thus, Maxwell’s demon shows that how one-bit secret information can be leaked. Landauer 
suggested from Maxwell’s demon that to reset the information gained by an attacker, which means to 
make situation level-1 = level-7, work KBT ln2 is required. Thus, Landauer principle calculates work 
require to keep information secret in the computer system. Thus to gain the secret attacker needs to do 
more than KBT ln2 work. 
In [21], a similar experiment was done by including weight in the system to measure the work 
done by the system. The figure-2 below explains the experiment with weight. The figure below 
explains that how an attacker can use the information about the position of the particle for his/her 
benefit. The attacker can, for example, use the system as an engine. He can add a partition to the left 
of the particle and can perform useful work for his/her benefit. 
 
 
 
 
Figure-2 One molecule engine proposed by Szilard 
In [22], Bennett represented this concept using Position vs. potential graph. The graph is shown in the 
figure-3 below. It describes that to know the position of the particle, a certain amount of potential 
barrier needs to be overcome. 
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Figure-3 Position vs. Potential graph to understand Maxwell’s demon 
As shown in level-1 of figure-3, the attacker doesn’t know the position of the particle. So particle 
can be either left at position – 0.5 or at right with position +0.5. Between both the position potential 
barrier of say kB ln T is available. So initial entropy, Si is kB ln T. After that to know the position 
attacker does the work equal to kB ln T. Due to this, as shown in level-2, the attacker knows the 
position of the particle. In the case shown in level-2, the position of the particle is to the right of the 
partition. For the situation shown in level-2, final entropy Sf is 0. Thus from levels 1 and 2, entropy 
difference can be calculated as shown below: 
Δ S = Sf - Si 
       = 0 - kB ln T 
       = - kB ln T      .... (5) 
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From equation-5, the secret behind the negative sign in Shannon’s entropy formula can be 
understood by the computer scientists. 
In the present work, we will demonstrate possible settings of Maxwell’s demon experiment for a 
practical imperative program like the simple imperative program, imperative multithreaded program, 
a probabilistic program with a point to point information leakage program, a program which generates 
infinite secret and the program executes in SOA based architecture.  
 
3. MAXWELL’S DEMON EXPERIMENTAL SETUP FOR PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE 
PROGRAMS 
 
The quantitative analysis, based on Shannon’s entropy formula has been used widely these days 
to decide the threshold of the information leakage in the programs. The Shannon’s formula is derived 
from the second principle of thermodynamics and Maxwell’s demon experiment. So our aim in this 
paper is to go in the reverse direction and try to find how the experimental setup of Maxwell’s demon 
can be, for practical programs which have the secret of one bit. In this section, Maxwell demon’s 
experimental setup will be investigated for five types of program: 
1 Simple imperative program,  
2 Imperative multithreaded programs,  
3 Probabilistic programs with point to point information leakage,  
4 Imperative program which generates infinite secret and 
5 The program executes in SOA based architecture. 
 
3.1 Simple imperative program 
 
In the present work, the simple imperative program has been considered as a sequential program 
without loops. An example of simple imperative program snippet is as below: 
 
secret variable = h  
 o: = h  
 
As shown in the snippet, h is high-security sensitive variable and o is observable. Assume that 
high-security sensitive variable h and observable o are one bit variable. In the second statement, the 
non-interference property is violated as high-security sensitive variable and observable interfere with 
each other. Thus, due to the second statement of the snippet, the program becomes reversible and 
violates the second law of thermodynamics as suggested in Maxwell’s demon experiment.  
For these types of simple imperative programs, the setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment will be 
same as shown in figure-1. The reason is, in the program, the one-bit secret is there which can be 
compared with the secret position of a gas particle in Maxwell demon experiment. The imperative 
program can be compared with the closed system as described in Maxwell’s experiment. Work 
required to protect the secret content will be kB ln T. In other words, the attacker needs to do 
minimum work kB ln T to get the secret. 
 
3.2 Imperative multithreaded program      
 
In simple terminology, multithreading is the ability of processor with a single core or multiple 
cores to execute more than one thread using the scheduler in such a way that it appears to the user that 
threads are being executed concurrently. In the present paper, it has been assumed that multithreaded 
programs are executed on a single core or a single processor with the help of scheduler. In [12, 13, 14] 
methods to quantify information leakage is provided. The scheduler in multithreaded program assigns 
the probability to the thread for execution and based on probability it picks up a thread for execution. 
Information leakage in the multithreaded program depends on the sequence in which threads are 
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picked up by the scheduler for the execution. An example of the imperative multithreaded program is 
as below: 
 
h = h mod 2; 
Th0: 
 l = h; 
Th1:  
 Th10: 
  l = k; 
 Th11: 
  l = m 
As shown in the example, h is high-security sensitive variable while l, k, and m are low-security 
sensitive variable. It has been assumed here that all variable i.e. h, k, l, and m are one-bit variables. 
For this imperative multithreaded program, the scheduler will assign the probabilities to threads Th0 
and Th1. The threads Th10 and Th11 are child threads. When l = h is executed at that time the non-
interference property will be violated. 
From physics perspectives, if we want to design Maxwell’s demon experiment then effects of 
scheduler needs to be considered. To consider scheduler effect, probability needs to be included in 
Maxwell demon experiment. The probability was included in this experiment by P. Malacaria and F. 
Smeraldi in [17]. In the experiment P. Malacaria and F. Smeraldi assumed that there is more than one 
system in the experiment and particle is found in two chambers of the systems with probability μ1 and 
μ2. It has been assumed that μ1 > μ2 and μ1 + μ2 =1. The boxes or systems considered in the figure-4 
have unit volume. In physics terminology, it was assumed that all the systems are identical and 
contain an ideal gas molecule. It has been assumed that piston is on the center position of the systems 
and shafts are connected at the end. Since molecules are in both the chambers of the systems, it will 
hit the piston from both the sides. The concept is shown in Figure-4 below. In the figure, two systems 
are shown with the probability that particle found in the left chambers (marked with label ‘a’ in 
figure-4) of both the system with probability μ1 and on the right chambers (marked with label ‘b’ in 
figure-4) of both the system with probability μ2. So piston will press the gas particle in the right 
chamber or in the left chamber. This concept is similar to the thread scheduling done by the scheduler. 
As shown in figure-4, pistons will move towards right till the pressure on both the sides is equal. 
This can be used to extract work from the system. In the experiment, Pi = μi kBT. Here P1 is the 
pressure in left chamber and P2 is the pressure in the right chamber. The volume of chambers are unit 
volume so V1 + V2 = 2. The expansion takes place till pressure in both sides are equal so, 
  
  
 =
  
  
. That 
means at the end of expansion we have V1 = 2μ1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-4 Maxwell’s demon experiment with two systems and probabilities 
Thus, from thermodynamics perspectives, work done by this system can be calculated as: 
a b 
a b 
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Wexp/kBT = 
 
   
        
   
 
    
                =   
  
 
   
   
 
 -  
  
   
   
 
   
                = μ1 ln 2 + μ1ln μ1 + μ2 ln 2 + μ2 ln μ2 
     = ln 2 – H(μ1, μ2 ) ln 2                                           .... (6) 
Thus, the attacker needs this much work to know about the secret in the multithreaded program 
which executes under the effect of scheduler. Similarly, for n systems, the above case is generalized 
and calculated work done is provided below. Detailed calculation of work done by n state system is 
provided in [17]. It is: 
Mn ln n/Mn – Mn-1 ln n-1/Mn-1 + μn ln μn                               ... (7)  
 
3.3 Imperative program with point to point information leakage 
In this method of quantification, the simple imperative program has been considered but leakage 
has been calculated between any two arbitrary points in the imperative program. In [15], this type of 
information leakage model has been discussed. In the paper, leakage in practical JAVA programs has 
been quantified. One similar example of an imperative program is given below: 
Program-1 
 Statement-1; 
Statement-2; 
Statement-3; 
Statement-4; 
Statement-5; 
End 
 
As shown in the program there are five statements. Aim here is to find leakage between any two 
statements. The interference between high-security sensitive variable and low-security sensitive 
variable may be or may not be between selected arbitrary points of the program. For example, in the 
above code snippet, interference is in statement-3. If statement-1 and statement-2 are selected to 
quantify leakage then it is possible that quantified leakage is zero. In the program above, it is assumed 
that high-security sensitive variable is of one bit. 
The setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment for this program will be hypothetical in nature. The 
setup is shown in the figure-5 below. In program two arbitrary points can be selected. Similarly, as 
shown in figure system walls XY and PQ are movable and allow attacker or user to select two points 
in the system. A particle of an ideal gas is in the left chamber as shown in the figure. The wall XY is a 
movable wall. If it is moved towards the right and crosses the particle then it is assumed that particle 
will be outside of the system through the wall XY. This is the hypothesis considered in this setup.  
 
 
 
Figure-5 Experimental setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment to quantify point to point information 
leakage in imperative program 
x 
Y 
P 
Q 
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As shown in the figure, volumes of chambers are V1 and V2. In the previous case, unit volumes 
were considered for both the chambers, but here this will not be the case.  So in this case, 
V1 + V2 ≠ 2 but let’s assume that V1 + V2 = Vtotal = x. It has been assumed that the piston will 
cover volume x-y during expansion. The probability that the particle is within the system boundary 
decided by the user is μ.  Let’s assume that the particle is within the system then work done by this 
system can be calculated as: 
Wexp =      
   
 
 
         =  
 
 
  
   
 
 
         = - μ (ln y – ln (x-y)) kBT                           ... (8) 
Thus, the attacker needs to do minimum work - μ (ln y – ln (x-y)) kBT as shown in equation-8. 
 
3.4 Imperative program which generates infinite secrets 
The quantitative analysis successfully measures the protection of secure content in the system but 
till 2014, it was assumed that secret and observations produced by the system are finite. But in 2014, 
F. Biondi et al. suggested in [20] that there can be programs or systems which can generate infinite 
secret and observables. In [20] method to quantify information leakage in such program was also 
provided. For example, consider the code snippet from [20] is provided below.  
secret int1 h; 
 if (h ==0) then 
  observable int1 o :=0; 
 while (0==0) do 
  random o:= randombit 
(0.5) ; 
  od 
 else 
  observable int1 o :=0; 
 while (0==0) do 
  random o:= randombit 
(0.75) ; 
  od 
 fi 
 return ; 
In the code snippet, variable h is high-security sensitive variable. If the value of variable h is zero 
then program will produce a string of infinite zeros and ones with same probability i.e. 0.5. If the 
value of h is 1 then zero will be produced with probability 0.75 and 1 will be produced with 
probability 0.25. Thus as shown in the code snippet, it generates infinite observable. The attacker will 
observe the behavior of some observable and based on that he will try to guess the value of high 
security sensitive variable h. It is clear for the above code snippet that after some iteration, leakage 
will be entire variable h, i.e. 1 bit.  
The setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment for programs which generate infinite observable is 
shown in the figure-6 below. In the figure, the probabilistic observable generation is omitted for 
simplicity. The probabilistic system will be similar to the one shown in subsection 3.2. The figure 
shows the experimental setup to deal with infinite observables. 
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Figure-6 Experimental setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment to quantify information leakage in imperative 
program which generates infinite observables 
As shown in the figure, hypothetical experimental setup of Maxwell demon experiment needs to 
be considered in this case. Both the chambers shown in figure-6 are infinite in length. The piston is in 
the center of the system and in this experiment, expansion of piston will take place till significant 
observable work is not achieved by the system. Assume that attacker needs k observables to find 
where the particle is.  
Here volume of both the chamber is infinite. Thus V1 + V2 = Vtotal = ∞. It is assumed that piston 
moves till attacker gets significant knowledge. So the assumption is expansion takes place till volume 
m. Work done in the system can be calculated as 
Wexp =      
 
 
 
         =  
 
 
  
 
 
 
         = ln (∞) – ln (m) kBT 
         = - (ln(m) - lim (k)) kBT                       .... (9) 
 
At volume m, an attacker may know the secret. In [20] equation H (h) – lim H (h| o1, o2, ...,ok) is 
used to quantify leakage. This is similar to equation-9. 
 
3.5 Program executes in Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
SOA is an architectural solution which provides loose coupling of services through the 
orchestration of service components. In the case of an SOA-based program, information leakage will 
not be just because of interference among the low-security sensitive and high-security sensitive 
variables but other architectural parameters will also play a crucial role in the quantification of 
information leakage. The detail about the SOA and attacks related to SOA are discussed in detail in 
[24] and [16, 25] respectively. In SOA, the parameters like network link will be outside of the closed 
system. Thus in the SOA based web services and programs, non-interference property needs to be 
considered in a global way. In this SOA based structure, interference is not only between the high 
variable and low variables but all other architectural factors. In the SOA based systems, the 
architectural parameters like the effect of link failure also needs to be considered which interfere with 
secure content.  
The setup of Maxwell’s demon experiment will be very similar to the one shown in figure-1 and 
figure-2. But as other factors (like network link) also get involved in the SOA-based program, in 
Maxwell’s demon experiment also other factors also needs to be considered. So Maxwell’s demon 
experimental setup, it is considered that the system is not in thermal isolation. The temperature 
outside the system can affect the work done by the system. The environmental elements affect the 
system; this phenomenon is known as decoherence. In SOA system, the attacker should know about 
the frequency of the link, similarly, in Maxwell’s demon experiment, the demon should know about 
the temperature outside the system. This situation rarely takes place in both the cases. But avoidance 
of decoherence situation is big research challenge in conventional computing as well as quantum 
computing. In this situation, calculation of work done is very complex to calculate. Recently, Anjaria 
k→∞ 
k→∞ 
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and Mishra, in [35] have successfully demonstrated the quantification of information leakage in SOA 
based system.  
From analysis of various experimental setups it can be concluded that at present, information security 
policies based on non-interference policy of various types of programming scenario were just an 
extension of Maxwell demon experimental setup. But for cloud computing and SOA based system, 
this conventional variations of Maxwell demon experimental setup will not work due to decoherence. 
To eliminate decoherence, computer scientists and physicists have to do combined efforts. In [35], 
Anjaria and Mishra have considered non-interference policy globally and quantified the leakage. This 
can be considered as a way to mitigate decoherence.  
    
4. RELATED WORK 
From second law of thermodynamics, in 1879, Rudolph Clausius suggested that spontaneous 
processes have preferred direction and this direction is from hotter body to cooler body. In deriving 
information theory and entropy, Shannon took help of this fact represented by Rudolph. Shannon first 
believed that information and the second law of thermodynamics can be related but then he focused 
on very important questions: Just like mechanical systems, is it possible to get knowledge about the 
work done by the system by observing states of the system only? In the question, work done can be 
considered as minimal work required protecting the secret content.  The answer to the above question 
was found from the concept of Maxwell’s demon. This famous concept of Maxwell’s demon was 
represented by Maxwell. The history of the experiment is available in [27].  
Lio Szilard converted Maxwell’s demon experiment into single molecule based Maxwell’s 
demon experiment in [18]. This same single molecule based experiment has been used in the paper to 
explain the relation between quantitative information and thermodynamics. Like Maxwell, Szilard 
also represented thought experiment only. In 1961, Landauer suggested in [23] that erasure of 
information in single molecule system or single bit information system is a dissipative process. In 
[28], A Berut et al. represented actual experimental set up to verify Szilard and Landauer’s principle. 
In [28], A Berut et al. used a system of a single colloidal particle, trapped in a modulated double-well 
potential to verify thought experiment represented by Szilard and Landauer.  
The logical explanation for the presence of demon and why demon will not be able to break the 
second law of thermodynamics was presented by Bennett and Oliver Penrose in [22] and [29] 
respectively. Bennett and Oliver Penrose argued that presence of demon and resetting of demon’s 
memory to initial place will dissipate heat. Landauer suggested in [23, 5] that resetting of memory 
always dissipate heat. From Landauer’s argument, Bennett and Oliver calculated and explained that 
due to this heat dissipation, the demon will not be able to violate the second principle of 
thermodynamics. Thorough and state of the art survey of thermodynamics and information is 
discussed in [4] by E Lutz and Sergio C. State of the art survey of the relation between 
thermodynamics and information in provided in [30] by Juan M. R. P. et al. 
The Maxwell’s demon, Landauer and Bennett’s principles have been widely used in mechanics, 
computer science, and statistics. In [31], John T and Craig L. provided quantum dot cellular automata 
model of Maxwell’s demon. This automata model is very useful to study computation and energy 
dissipation in computing. In [32], D. Mandal and C. Jarzynski proposed information processing 
solvable model of Maxwell’s demon which can be used in computation and mechanics widely to 
model the work and energy dissipation. In [34] and [17], P. Malacaria and F. Smeraldi successfully 
attempted to relate secure computing, confidentiality, quantitative analysis of information and 
physical process and systems. P. Malacaria and F. Smeraldi argued using thermodynamics that any 
computing system whose final state is observable must dissipate WkBT ln2 energy. In equation, W is 
information theoretic notion of quantitative information flow. In the papers [17] and [34] timing 
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channel and entropy variations were also addressed. The work done by P. Malacaria and F. Smeraldi 
is the main motivation behind this present paper. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE    
Once the fundamental relationship was established between information and thermodynamics, an 
attempt has been made in the present paper to relate recent trend in confidentiality and information 
quantification with thermodynamics. In the present work, minimal work required by an attacker to 
gain confidential information is also calculated for five cases i.e. 1 Information leakage in imperative 
program 2 imperative multithreaded program 3 point to point leakage in imperative program 4 
imperative program with infinite observation and 5 imperative program in the SOA-based 
environment. The possible experimental setup of Maxwell’s demon was also described for each five 
cases. Although at first possible experimental setups of Maxwell’s demon look impractical, in [28], 
the simple experimental setup has already been proposed. So in future, setup of other variations of this 
experiment may also be possible. 
At present, we make no claims about practical implications of the proposed method in any 
specific field but in future, this work will be helpful to find many unanswered questions in the fields 
of computation energy dissipation, quantitative analysis, and information secrecy. The present work 
will also help to understand confidentiality in quantum computing. The work can be related in the 
future with nano-computing and technology, molecular and biological computing fields. This work 
bridges the computer science and physics so that physicist and computer scientists can together solve 
some complex problems in information flow security and quantitative analysis of information leakage. 
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